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Abstract: When W. J. T. Mitchell published his seminal essay “The Picto-
rial Turn” in 1992, he was explicitly alluding to Richard Rorty’s famous 
anthology The Linguistic Turn, which appeared exactly a quarter century 
before: in 1967. He thereby suggested that these two “turns” are of the 
same kind. This suggestion is quite wrong and leads to a severe misun-
derstanding of new approaches emerging now in the humanities under 
names such as “visual studies” or (in Swedish) “bildvetenskap.”
It is quite an amazing fact that all sorts of “turns” have been turn-
ing up around the recent turn of the century that, simultaneously, 
was also a turn of the millennium. In 1998, for instance, a book of 
essays by Fredric Jameson was published under the title The Cul-
tural Turn, adopting an expression that had gained a certain cur-
rency in postmodern discourse where it indicates a heightened 
interest in the infl uence of cultural contexts on all sorts of human 
activities from sex to science. In several branches of the humani-
ties there has also been a rumor of a so-called “spatial turn,” an 
allegedly new way of thinking that relies on categories like “site”, 
“zone” and “enclosure”, claiming to replace the outworn temporal 
paradigms of evolution and revolution. In Germany, and fortu-
nately only in Germany, there has been a big fuss about a freshly 
invented “performative turn”. But the most popular “turn” of all is 
undoubtedly the “pictorial turn”. In Scandinavia, too, such a picto-
rial turn has recently been called for, not only in art history but 
also in several other disciplines, from anthropology to law, and, 
consequently, fashionable approaches are gaining ground now in 
all fi elds of the humanities under such names as “visual studies”.
The infl ationary talk of all those “turns” initially creates the 
impression that all those new alignments of thinking vary only 
in their respective goals. In each case, a theoretical re-orientation 
is recommended, just that in one case it is aimed in this direction 
and in the next case in the other. And since all of these reversals 
and revulsions are proclaimed under the same fashionable label 
of a “turn”, there are reasons to suspect that the re-organizations 
of the various disciplines described in this way are likewise only 
symptoms of fashion. These days, it seems, even academic disci-
plines have to launch new collections from season to season.
The talk about “turns” was fi rst put into circulation by the Aus-
trian philosopher Gustav Bergmann. While still a student, Berg-
mann became the youngest member of the Vienna Circle, led by 
Moritz Schlick. Later, in 1938, he emigrated to the USA and taught 
for forty years at the University of Iowa. In a short article from 
1953, in which he sought to characterize the philosophical school 
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of Logical Positivism (as well as in other texts from this period), 
he described those who felt themselves to be members of this 
school as followers of the “linguistic turn” that was – Bergmann 
asserted – brought about primarily by Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. 
(In coining this expression Bergmann was, of course, inspired 
by Schlick’s 1930 essay “Die Wende der Philosophie”, an English 
translation of which was later, in 1959, published under the title 
“The Turning Point in Philosophy”.) 
In 1967, fourteen years after its fi rst publication, Bergmann’s 
paper was, together with more than thirty other texts, reprinted 
in a collection of essays edited by a then thirty-six-year-old assis-
tant professor of philosophy at Princeton University. His name 
was Richard Rorty, and the title he gave to his anthology was 
“The Linguistic Turn”. Anyone coming across this book would 
immediately have realized that its dust jacket showed a quite re-
markable design that was obviously infl uenced by an aesthetic 
fashionable with the hippies. It was, to be sure, 1967, the Summer 
of Love, but then again the essays that Rorty had collected were 
actually a little too dry for that sort of packaging. Nevertheless, 
one may infer that the linguistic turn was, in its time, seen as 
something pretty groovy. Thus, one might also have read the title 
of the book as an echo of the title of a long-playing record that 
had been released two years earlier by The Byrds, a then popular 
band from California: Turn! Turn! Turn! In any case, however, a 
resonance was certainly intended with the famous slogan “Turn 
on, tune in, drop out!”.
Quite appropriate to the progressive presentation of the book, 
its title “The Linguistic Turn”, which, as Rorty has explicitly ac-
knowledged in a later book, he had not invented himself, but tak-
en over from Bergmann, was meant to signify nothing less than a 
philosophical “revolution”. Rorty states this at the very beginning 
of his introduction with the following words: “The purpose of the 
present volume is to provide materials for refl ection on the most 
recent philosophical revolution, that of linguistic philosophy. I 
shall mean by ‘linguistic philosophy’ the view that philosophical 
problems are problems which may be solved (or dissolved) either 
by reforming language, or by understanding more about the lan-
guage we presently use.”
Irrespective of which of these two variants one might choose, 
though, the linguistic turn in any case amounts to the conviction 
that philosophical problems are to be solved by an analysis of 
language. Whether this conviction was well-founded need not be 
assessed here. For the sake of the argument it is suffi cient to note 
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that the linguistic turn was not a turn towards new problems that 
had to be investigated. To the contrary, it rather was a new way of 
dealing with old problems: the same old problems and actually, 
so to speak, the eternal problems of philosophy, with which it had 
struggled right from the start. 
Rorty himself refers to this continuity in his 1979 book Philos-
ophy and the Mirror of Nature, where, on page 263, he comments 
upon the familiar model of the history of philosophy, according to 
which there have been three different epochs: From antiquity to 
the baroque, it was believed that one could deal directly with the 
things that exist, and philosophers thus undertook wholly inno-
cent speculation on the peculiarities of the various entities (from 
ordinary things up to the ideas and to God). From the sixteenth 
to the nineteenth century that is, in the era in which, according 
to Foucault, the “classical episteme” predominated philosophers 
turned critically to the mental categories and procedures about 
which one should obtain clarity a priori of all further knowledge, 
since the human mind must always already make use of these 
when it seeks to make anything comprehensible at all. Finally, in 
the twentieth century, philosophers realized that even the mind’s 
effort to recognize its own mechanisms will lead to highly specu-
lative results, so that their focus shifted towards the public and 
generally accessible realm of language in which our understand-
ing of the physical and metaphysical world is laid down.
Linguistic philosophy thus is the successor of ontology and 
epistemology and it inherits their legacy. All of the problems that 
were already addressed by its predecessors are reformulated by 
linguistic philosophy as problems of language in order to solve 
those same old problems and not new and different problems. 
This can be seen very clearly by considering an example from the 
fi eld of aesthetics. Something that has occupied thinkers in this 
fi eld since time immemorial is the question – presently becom-
ing urgent again – of what beauty is. The answer to this question 
was initially sought by investigating the peculiarities of beautiful 
things; later, it was examined what sensations are caused in a 
person perceiving something beautiful; fi nally, it was sought to 
solve the riddle by analyzing the content and the validity of lin-
guistically codifi ed judgments of beauty.
From this example alone, anyone willing to think about it for 
fi ve minutes will realize how absurd it would now be to demand 
yet another turn and to assert that the question of what beauty 
really is can only be answered by an analysis of pictures. And 
presumably it would be still far more absurd to try to solve all 
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the other great questions of philosophy as well – the question of 
moral rules, for instance – by examining pictures. It is therefore 
impossible that the analysis of pictures could have the same sta-
tus in philosophy as the analysis of language.
The analysis of language was a universal means by which, in 
principle, any philosophical problem could be approached. By 
means of an analysis of pictures, by contrast, such problems can-
not even be formulated, let alone solved. Ask, for example, what a 
picture is by means of pictures, or try to answer it with pictures. 
It doesn’t work. Even when one only uses pictures to illustrate 
philosophical concepts that have already been formulated in lan-
guage – as was done, for example, in a German book that won an 
Italian graphic design prize, the dtv-Atlas Philosophie – a certain 
touch of the tragicomic can hardly be avoided. From these obser-
vations, however, it cannot be concluded that pictures have no 
cognitive content at all or that they do not merit close attention. 
No, it is rather the case that we, especially if we love pictures 
and cannot imagine ever being able to exist without them, should 
treat pictures like we treat the persons we love: We should not 
demand too much from them, and certainly not something that 
is completely impossible.
As a matter of fact, though, no one has ever demanded that 
pictures be made the central or exclusive means of philosophical 
refl ection anyway. There are, of course, a lot of amiable people 
in this fi eld who keep telling us that our attitudes and experi-
ences are not only formed by language but also by our “imagi-
nation” and our various “world pictures”. Isn’t it obvious, they 
ask, that our “relationship to the world” is not only “imparted” by 
language but also by images? In a certain sense this is undeniable 
since no one will dispute that our conceptions of the world are 
often mediated by pictures in the form of paintings, photographs, 
images on the screens of television sets or computer monitors. 
The infl uence of such pictures on what we know and what we 
desire cannot be overlooked by anyone. A problem arises only 
when we are no longer talking about material pictures but rather 
about mental images, because then the danger arises of falling 
back into a speculative exploration of the Geist, from which the 
protagonists of the linguistic turn sought, with good reason, to 
turn away. The trouble is that a “world picture” that is said to 
dominate a person or a whole era can never be recognized by di-
rect inspection, but only through an investigation of its concrete 
manifestations: of what is actually said and done. It is only from 
these manifestations (including, among other things, the ways in 
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which material pictures are designed and employed) that one can 
reconstruct a certain conception of the world that had a spell on 
us. It is not unusual to say (just like Wittgenstein does in ‚ §115 of 
his Philosophical Investigations) that in such a case “a picture held 
us captive”. But here the term “picture” degenerates into a mere 
metaphor that could just as well be replaced by expressions like 
“presupposition”, “attitude” or “way of thinking”.
At least in philosophy, therefore, a pictorial turn cannot have 
the same status as the linguistic turn, which has long been rightly 
honored in the fi eld. But there is more at stake than just phil-
osophy. Admittedly, that is where the attention-grabbing slogan 
“linguistic turn” was created and introduced, but soon thereafter 
it began to circulate in ever wider orbits around the sphere of its 
origin. Thereby it acquired a distinctive aura of particular intellec-
tual dignity, on which, after all, W. J. T. Mitchell could rely when, 
exactly a quarter century after the appearance of Rorty’s antholo-
gy, he wrote an essay for the journal Artforum that was published 
in the March 1992 issue where it was placed between articles on 
new Chinese fi lms and works by the sculptor Jana Sterbak and 
adorned with a whole series of illustrations, all showing (mostly 
three-dimensional) works of art not mentioned in the text at all. 
The title of Mitchell’s essay was “The Pictorial Turn”. 
Since the programmatic title of this essay is without a doubt 
a thousand times better known than its content, it is worthwhile 
fi rst to sketch briefl y what Mitchell actually says. He starts by 
quoting the passage that was already paraphrased above, the 
passage in which Rorty presents the history of philosophy as a 
sequence of two great conversions: fi rst from ontology to epis-
temology and then further to philosophy of language. However, 
as soon as the third stage was reached in the twentieth century, 
Mitchell adds immediately, language was not only interpreted as 
a “model” within philosophy, but elsewhere as well. Thus soci-
ety, for example, has been understood as a text and nature as 
a discourse. Who ever might have espoused these views is not 
specifi ed, however, since Mitchell, as he openly admits, is not 
completely familiar with these matters: “What these shifts in 
intellectual and academic discourse have to do with each other, 
much less with everyday life and ordinary language, is not es-
pecially self-evident. But it does seem clear that another shift is 
occurring in what philosophers talk about, and that once again a 
complexly related transformation is occurring in the production 
and understanding of culture. I want to call this shift “the picto-
rial turn.”
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According to these sentences, then, philosophy is still the lead-
ing discipline that has to establish the direction in which the 
other disciplines will march. And the reason why Mitchell feels 
entitled to affi rm a new turn in philosophy in 1992 is simply that 
he had observed “a shift in what philosophers talk about”. Yet not 
only in philosophy, but also in many other academic disciplines 
and even in daily life, everyone is talking more and more about 
the same thing: pictures. This gives Mitchell license to proclaim 
that a mighty, new and radical “turn” is underway, one that, as the 
rhetorical opening of his essay suggests, has just as fundamental 
and far-reaching consequences as the two great re-orientations of 
philosophy mentioned by Rorty.
As it is actually described by Mitchell, the pictorial turn, how-
ever, is nothing but a turn to a certain topic of discourse. And in 
itself this topic was not even new at the start of the 1990s; new 
was only the intensity with which this topic came to be debated 
in philosophy, in various academic disciplines, and in the general 
cultural public. Yet in spite of this, the way in which Mitchell 
presents his case has the effect of suggesting that the pictorial 
turn is a much more radical change of the same scope as the previ-
ously so successful linguistic turn.
It has been shown already that this is not the case, at least as 
far as philosophy is concerned. Now Mitchell is not really a phil-
osopher but rather a scholar active in several other disciplines, 
mostly the history of literature and art. Nevertheless it obviously 
seems very important to him to prove that the pictorial turn he 
has identifi ed had its origin in philosophy. In order to demon-
strate this, he drops the names of numerous philosophers, all of 
whom – as he puts it in the sentence quoted above – “talk” about 
pictures. Among those he names are Peirce, Goodman, Derrida, 
and even Wittgenstein. These thinkers are not, of course, the best 
witnesses for his case, since their work on picture theory was 
in each case unmistakably inspired by the methods of linguistic 
analysis, or at least semiotics. Even Mitchell himself can in the 
end no longer overlook the fact that his chosen supporters would 
certainly not intervene unconditionally in favor of his position, 
and thus he seeks refuge in the adventurous thesis that the at-
tempt to investigate pictures from the perspective of language 
analysis is itself a symptom of fear of the power and magic of 
pictures, and this unease must, in turn, be seen as “a sure sign that 
a pictorial turn is taking place”.
After these declarations, which are hardly convincing, Mitchell 
provides some further examples for the increased interest in pic-
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tures in various academic disciplines. Here he mentions, among 
other things, Debord’s criticism of the “society of the spectacle” 
and Foucault’s investigations of the institutions and practices 
of surveillance (which are actually not so much concerned with 
pictures, but with the gaze). In addition, Mitchell describes insis-
tently how pictures are becoming increasingly important in daily 
life, which he attributes above all to the growing infl uence of tele-
vision. With the latter assertion most of us would certainly agree, 
and evidently a lot of other phenomena may also be cited from 
which we can read the rising levels of the ever-swelling fl oods of 
images in our contemporary culture. Also, hardly anyone would 
doubt the observation that pictures are increasingly interesting 
and important matters for investigation in various academic dis-
ciplines. 
What is open to doubt, however, is another assertion that 
Mitchell advances right at the beginning of his essay in connec-
tion with his already mentioned remark that, in the wake of the 
linguistic turn, many different academic disciplines began to see 
language as a model for a better understanding of their respec-
tive objects of investigation. The same role, Mitchell would now 
like to persuade us, has recently been increasingly assumed by 
pictures: “The picture now has a status somewhere between what 
Thomas Kuhn called a ‘paradigm’ and an ‘anomaly,’ emerging as a 
central topic of discussion in the human sciences in the way that 
language did: that is, as a kind of model or fi gure for other things 
(including fi guration itself), and as an unsolved problem, perhaps 
even the object of its own ‘science,’ what Erwin Panofsky called 
an ‘iconology.’” 
In this passage Mitchell mingles two aspects of the pictorial 
turn that, for the sake of clarity, should be clearly distinguished. 
On the one hand, he observes that pictures present academics in 
various disciplines with a growing number of puzzles. If this is so, 
pictures function, as was repeatedly pointed out before, simply as 
objects of investigation that one would like to explore more thor-
oughly. On the other hand, Mitchell claims that many scholars 
also seek to make progress in the research of any possible objects 
of their investigation by conceiving these as pictures.
Unfortunately, though, Mitchell does not give even one ex-
ample for this method, and indeed it is very doubtful whether he 
could. It is clear that one can understand many objects of theo-
retical curiosity – the mechanisms of fashion or the structure of 
the deoxyribonucleic acid molecule, for example – by viewing 
them as phenomena that have the structure and the function of 
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a language or, put another way, of a code. And it is just as clear 
that Mitchell, to make plausible the analogy he suggests between 
the pictorial turn and the linguistic turn, must assert that the pic-
ture, too, can assume the role of such a paradigm for the under-
standing of all sorts of other phenomena. Such an assertion, to 
be sure, goes far beyond the simple claim that actual research 
into such phenomena will, among other things, have to make use 
of pictures. Pictures have always been used by cultural theorists 
in their research of the periodic turns and changes of fashion, 
and biologists presumably would not have achieved very much 
in their analysis of the genome had they not been able to rely 
on a number of methods of “image processing”. Evidently, then, 
the pictorial turn does not amount to recommending a broader 
or more intensive use of such methods. No one would demand, 
for example, that we do away with Geiger counters so as to work 
only with the images of visible traces in cloud chambers. The 
pictorial turn is not about propagating a more extensive use of 
pictures in research or in the presentation of research results. 
It is instead about paying more attention to the various ways in 
which pictures are used in nearly all scientifi c disciplines anyway. 
Mitchell’s thesis may therefore not be reduced to the unproblem-
atic observation that various disciplines pursue their investiga-
tion of their respective phenomena by using pictures; his thesis 
aims, rather, at the assertion that those phenomena are them-
selves understood as pictures. Only if this were the case would 
the pictorial turn really bring about a re-orientation as fundamen-
tal as Mitchell would like to suggest.
It seems doubtful, however, that this is really so. And it seems 
just as doubtful whether anything would really be gained if it 
were so. Does one really understand the mechanisms of fashion 
or the functioning of the DNA better by portraying these phe-
nomena as pictures or sequences of pictures? Is our thinking ef-
fectively “turned on” in this way? Certainly not. It is simply not 
true that the problems of philosophy or sociology or human ge-
netics or psychology or computer science can be solved by letting 
ourselves be governed in all these disciplines by the paradigm 
of picture analysis. On the contrary, it is precisely the other way 
round. The problems of the analysis of pictures are solved when 
one uses all the specialized and specifi c methods from all those 
other disciplines. The picture is thus – as opposed to language 
– not a model that will allow us a better or even a different under-
standing of all possible phenomena. Pictures themselves are the 
phenomena we wish to understand better. And only because pic-
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tures are not the means of our efforts at understanding, but rather 
the ends of such efforts, is it possible to call for the establishment 
of a new science of pictures to be developed: an “iconology” or a 
“bildvetenskap”.
It is well known that a general science of language already ex-
ists, and it is worth pointing out that the inauguration of this dis-
cipline was not the result of the linguistic turn. The linguistic turn, 
to emphasize it one last time, was in no way an effort to open up 
and establish a new fi eld of research, but instead an attempt to 
introduce a method that could be used in all possible fi elds of 
research. The pictorial turn, by contrast, actually comes down to a 
recommendation to focus on a certain range of phenomena that 
should be studied more carefully and thoroughly. It is concerned 
with the question of what is to be investigated. The linguistic turn, 
on the contrary, propagated a certain method of exploring any 
range of phenomena whatsoever. It was concerned with the to-
tally different question of how something is to be investigated. 
This is – in all brevity – the difference between the pictorial turn 
and the linguistic turn.
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